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SEX AND SENTENCING
by Mark C. Clements
The sentencing of a convicted offender is a crucial step in the criminal
process.1 The judge may be given discretion to choose between several methods
of punishment, or the decision may be pre-empted by the dictates of the state
legislature. In either case, discrimination on the basis of the sex of the offender
exists. Despite the physical differences between the sexes, it has not been shown
that women uniformly rehabilitate any faster or slower than men." Yet, dis-
crimination exists not only in circumstances involving more severe treatment
for women, but less severe treatment as well.
The varying treatment of the sexes by sentencing judges and statutes may be
an expression of the American view of the female in society. Generally, legis-
latures have enacted statutes providing her with "needed" protection,' while
sentencing judges have viewed her as having powers of rehabilitation far
beyond the average male offender."
This Comment combines two areas of prime concern in the American so-
ciety: treatment of convicted offenders and treatment of women. If a convicted
offender is a female, even though society has condemned her by the same
method as her male counterpart, she is not always faced with the same conse-
quences. In short, because of a difference in sex, two persons with identical
backgrounds, convicted of the same crime, are not always treated equally.
Initially, consideration will be given to the status of the American female
at the turn of the century. It was at that time that most of the sentencing
statutes pertaining solely to women were enacted. Second, consideration will
be given to sentencing attitudes, practices, and theories. Third, potential
methods of reform and sources of relief will be explored.
I. THE VIEW OF THE FEMALE CIRCA 1900
While women became more socially and economically independent in the
early twentieth century,' in the eyes of the law, they were yet to be emancipated.
Perhaps the most widespread view was that women needed to be "protected."
Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States at the turn of the century stated
that American women were in a disadvantaged position, such that even if all
' See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLEGE OF A FREE SOCIETY 141-46 (1967); Wechsler, Princi-
ples of Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE-THE CRIMINAL
IN THE ARMS OF THE LAW 450 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).
2See, e.g., D. WARD & G. KASSEBAUM, WOMEN'S PRISON-SEX AND SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE (1965). This was a comprehensive study of the California Institution for Women at
Frontera, California. Although originally directed at homosexuality in a women's prison,
research indicated that women, even though treated less severely than men, reacted to prison
with more psychological pain. Id. at 56-79. See note 121 infra.
'See notes 6-7 infra, and accompanying text.
'See notes 7-24 infra, and accompanying text.
'In 1848, the first meeting of the Women's Rights Convention was held. E. ROOSEVELT
& L. HICKOK, LADIES OF COURAGE 1-4 (1954). Even though a Declaration of Women's
Rights was prepared at the meeting, the legal status of women remained unaffected. How-
ever, the changes in the American culture-changes which came about through social rather
than legal means-were a prime factor in the beginning of social and economic independence
for women. "On the whole she was more profoundly influenced than the man because many
of the inventions [during this period) brought her vocational openings that did much to
establish her economic independence." E. GROVES, THE AMERICAN WOMAN 246 (1937).
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restrictions on political, personal, and contractual rights were removed, women
would still "rest upon and look to [men] for protection."' However, if pro-
tection was really what women required, as the Supreme Court asserted, it
would be hard to reconcile the satisfaction of that requirement with the dis-
parate treatment they actually received.
The Early Statutory Scheme. Until 1869 women were convicted and imprisoned
under the same statutory provisions as male offenders. During the period be-
tween the Civil War and World War I, however, ten states enacted legislation
creating separate facilities for women convicted of criminal acts.' In 1869,
Indiana became the first state to provide by statute for a separate correctional
institution for female offenders.! By 1915 the other nine states had enacted
similar legislation.9 These acts were the result of "steadily increasing demand
for legislation establishing women's reformatories."10 Although these statutes
were generally addressed to the problem of separate facilities for women
offenders, they often extended into the area of sentencing. These statutes es-
tablishing separate facilities for imprisonment also established the use of the
indeterminate sentence for women offenders. Seven of the ten states used solely
an indeterminate sentence, two used both the determinate and the indetermi-
nate, and one gave the trial judge discretion to use either.11
All of the original ten states made some use of the indeterminate sentence.
Actually, the sentence was only "indeterminate" within limits set by law or
by the court. Eight of the ten required no minimum sentence for misdemeanor
convictions; five required no minimum in felony cases; two required both a
maximum and a minimum in felony cases; and two required both in mis-
demeanor cases." Of course, once the mechanism for differing treatment had
been created by way of these statutes, discrimination according to the sex of
the offender in terms of sentence duration was not far behind.13
The Problems and Theories of Sentencing. Two major theories have developed
in the area of sentencing. Although these viewpoints have been developing
for quite some time, 4 neither has proven superior to the other, and neither,
as yet, has become established as being free from major flaws. Perhaps the
major reason for the failure of one of the two theories to become established
to the exclusion of the other is the indecisiveness of the American society
with regard to the goals to be achieved by way of the sentencing decision.
"Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
Rogers, A Digest of Laws Establishing Reformatories for Women in the United States,
8 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 518, 520 (1917). Those 10 states were Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
'Law of May 13, 1869, ch. 32, § 1, [1869] Ind. Laws 61.
'See Rogers, supra note 7, at 538.
1 1Id. at 518.
11 Id. at 526.
12 Id.
1 See notes 56-65 infra, and accompanying text.
"
4 See, e.g., D. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (2d ed. 1793).
Professor Beccaria favored identical disposition of all persons convicted of the same offense.
See also B. RUSH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON




The first theory is that offenders should be sentenced to identical terms for
the same offense." This would seem to present the most equitable situation
because equality of treatment would seem to be the converse of discrimination.
However, it has been charged that the theory results in harsh and rigid treat-
ment."6 Two individuals who commit an identical crime are not likely to have
the same temperament, disposition, or rehabilitative capacity.' Consequently,
these differences in personality create tremendous problems in terms of equality
of treatment. Just as no two individuals are likely to commit a crime with the
same motivating influence, so are no two individuals likely to react to in-
carceration in the same way. Imprisonment may protect society temporarily,
and it may give society retribution to a degree, ' but once the offender has been
rehabilitated, continued detainment serves no purpose but to deny society a
producing member. Once rehabilitated, further imprisonment can only leave
prisoners embittered and laboring under the feeling that they have been mis-
treated."6 The problem is how to find the point of rehabilitation, and at the
same time avoid unequal sentencing.
The second theory is individualized disposition based on the character and
personality of the offender." An early advocate of this model favored indetermi-
nate sentencing based on the offender's rehabilitation progress, so that when an
offender entered prison neither he nor the sentencing court could project what
length his term would be." The term would be based on a constant reevalua-
tion by an administrative authority. Obviously, for a sentencing judge to make
an individualized disposition would require his having widespread discretion.
It is this discretion that disturbs critics of this model. They contend that where
there is discretion, there is abuse of that discretion."' While judges are in-
fluenced by many factors when sentencing, it appears that few sentencing de-
cisions are motivated by a sincere desire to rehabilitate the offender." Therefore,
1" See D. BECCARIA, supra note 14. Professor Beccaria did not favor the same range being
applicable to every person convicted of the same offense. He favored the exact punishment
being given to each offender. However, in the context of this Comment, identical sentencing,
or equality of sentencing, refers to having each offender subject to the same sentencing
standard.
'eSee, e.g., P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORREcTION 430 (1960).
I Not only has this statement received a great deal of support, it almost seems axiomatic.
18 See, eg., Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960). The author lists the following objectives which are
to be achieved by way of the sentencing decision: rehabilitation of the offender, isolation of
the offender from society, deterrence of other potential offenders, community condemnation,
and retribution-which he defines as the "satisfaction of the community's emotional desire
to punish the offender." Id. at 1455.
'
9 D'Esposito, Sentencing Disparity. Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 182,
183 n.8 (1969).
2 See note 15 supra.
21B. RUSH, supra note 14.
"* George, Comparative Sentencing Techniques, 23 FED. PROB., Mar. 1959, at 27. George
contended that the mere threat of abuse of discretion is reason enough to avoid individualized
sentencing.
2'See, e.g., the studies done on sentencing judges, notes 25-44 infra. No two studies
seem to agree as to the same variables which affect sentencing. This can partially be attri-
buted to the slightly different purposes of the studies. Compare Comment, Texas Sentencing
Practices: A Statistical Study, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 471 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Texas
Study], with Martin, The Defendant and Criminal Justice, Univ. of Texas Bulletin No.
3437; Bureau of Research in Social Sciences, Study No. 9 (1934). The Texas Study, the
most recent, found the sex of the offender to be relevant. Texas Study at 496. The older
study found that sex was not significant statistically. Martin, supra, at 239.
(Vol. 26
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this theory faces the difficulty of having an objective-individualized rehabili-
tation-which is not dependent upon the motivations of the sentencing de-
cision-makers. 4
II. SENTENCING JUDGES AND THE DISCRETION MODEL
A. The Studies of Sentencing Judges
The Gaudet Study. In 1933 a study was undertaken using 7,442 criminal cases
in one county in New Jersey. ' The purpose of the study was to determine
what factors influenced a sentencing judge. The investigators began their study
with the idea in mind that "one of [society's] greatest fallacies" was the belief
that "men do not differ widely in their natural mental abilities."" The investi-
gators also stated that there was a well-recognized opinion among recidivists
in the county that sentencing tendencies differed among the judges. The
investigators used cases tried by six judges over a nine-year period."9 It was
found that the sentencing tendencies of a judge were determined before he
came to the bench."' Generally speaking, the education, religion, profession, and
social experiences of the judge determined his sentencing tendency." The
differences between the sentences given by the six judges were striking."
The Martin Study. A year later a study was released evaluating ten percent of
the felony cases disposed of by Texas district courts in 1930. The prime pur-
pose of the study was to investigate the relationship between the sentence and
the social traits of the defendant. The tendencies found were that judges favor
white citizens over Negroes, Mexicans, and "others"; married men over single
" See notes 25-44 infra.
23Gaudet, Harris, & St. John, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies ofjudges, 23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 811, 812-13 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Gaudet Study].
This study has been called the "most widely cited and probably the most influential of all
American studies of disparity in sentencing .... " See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 535.
"Gaudet Study at 811. The classic experiment laying bare this fallacy was noted by
the investigators as a case in which 116 high school mathematics teachers were asked to
grade identical geometry tests. The scores ranged from 28% to 92%. MONROE, DE Voss
& REAGAN, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 322 (1930).
27 Gaudet Study at 812.
21 Id. at 813.
29 Gaudet tentatively concluded the single most relevant factor was the judge's "en-
vironment." When using this term, Gaudet was referring to the entire personal history of
the judge--in effect, what had made the personality of the judge.
" Gaudet Study at 814.
31 Id. at 816-17. The bar graphs representing the data collected by the investigators
show how marked the differences can be between two judges who have been sitting on
similar cases for approximately the same period. A summary of the results is reflected in
the following table:
PERCENTAGE OF TYPES OF SENTENCES GIVEN
Judge 1 2 3 4 5 6
Imprisonment 35.6% 33.6% 53.3% 57.7% 45.0% 50.0%
Probation 28.5 30.4 20.2 19.5 28.1 32.4
Fine 2.5 2.2 1.6 3.1 1.9 1.9
Suspension 33.4 33.8 24.3 19.7 25.0 15.7
# of cases 1235 1693 1869 1489 480 676
Id. at 816. A cursory look at the Imprisonment percentages will confirm the opinion, which
Gaudet found was held by many of the recidivists in this county, that differences existed in
the sentencing tendencies of these judges.
" Martin, supra note 23.
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men; taxpayers over tax delinquents; widowed persons over divorced persons;
and those with children over those without.8 Factors found to be not statistic-
ally significant upon the severity of the sentence were the age, sex, and amount
of education of the defendant.34
The Texas Study. A more recent study done in 1967 showed that the identity
of the trial judge was statistically significant.' This would confirm the results
of the Gaudet Study.' The purposes of this study were to define those factors
that might influence the sentencing decision, and to determine the impact which
the personal characteristics of the offender might have on the decision. The
investigators accumulated 1,720 felony cases from twenty-seven courts in nine-
teen large Texas counties."7 Those factors found to be statistically significant
with regard to the administration of criminal justice were pretrial freedom,
counsel, and the trial court-those who were not able to obtain pretrial free-
dom were generally sentenced more severely; those with appointed counsel
tended to receive more severe treatment than those with retained counsel;
and those sentenced by the judge rather than by the jury were subject to sen-
tencing disparities due to the personal background of the trial judge.' Relevant
characteristics of the offenders which influenced the severity of sentence were
prior convictions, marital status, age, educational level, and sex."' Women were
found to receive much better treatment than male offenders, the judges show-
ing "something of a chivalrous attitude toward women."' The investigators also
pointed out that "a substantially higher percentage of women offenders receive
sentences involving nonimprisonment than do their male counterparts."'" The
investigators further attributed sentencing differences to the popular belief
that women commit crimes of passion, and are "seldom possessed of pervasive
criminal tendencies that more often characterize male criminals."" This study,
being more inclusive in its scope and more current than the Martin Study, is
probably more accurate as well.
The extent of disparity in sentencing because of sex and other classifications
is dramatic.4 The studies discussed above show that women do not uniformly
38 Id.
"A fourth factor found to be not relevant was the presence or absence of parents at
sentencing. Id. at 96.
"Texas Study at 489.
'The Gaudet Study used the term "environment" of the trial judge when referring to
his character traits derived from experience. See note 29 supra. The Texas Study used the
term "identity" of the trial judge, but was referring to substantially the same thing.
11 Texas Study at 481-82.
'l Id. at 485-90.




4' Id. at 496; see note 104 infra.
' For example, in 1965 the Florida Civil Liberties Union did a study and found that
between 1940 and 1964, 54 men were sentenced to death in Florida. Six were white and
48 were Negroes. One of the white men was actually executed, while 29 of the 48 Negroes
were executed. In New York between 1957 and 1962, 50 persons were sentenced to death
-40 were Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Eleven were actually executed, all of whom were
Negroes or Puerto Ricans. Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional
Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 67-68 (1966). The sexual difference in sentencing is just as
striking. In 1967, the Federal Bureau of Investigation compiled data from 3,985 agencies
[Vol. 26
COMMENTS
receive longer sentences than men. Quite the contrary, the results of the Texas
Study seem to indicate a more lenient attitude toward women. One commenta-
tor has stated: "Our society is disproportionately soft on the female offender...
throughout the whole legal process . . . .This represents a male-dominated
society's showing deference to the symbol of woman ...."" Male offenders
far outnumber women at every level of judicial administration.'
B. The Discretion Model
"No possible punishments can deter women from heaping crime upon
crime. Their perversity of mind is more fertile in new crimes than the
imagination of a judge in new punishments."
Despite the above view, the studies and percentages indicate that where
discretion exists, the female fares well. This is not true individualization of
sentencing, which is the objective of the discretion model, since women as a
group are less likely to be imprisoned than their male counterparts convicted
of the same crime."'
If discretion is given by statute to a judge, it must be exercisable with both
male and female defendants. For example, in Commonwealth v. Daniels' Jane
Daniels was convicted of robbery. A Pennsylvania statute provided that women
were to be given an indeterminate term,49 while males guilty of the same of-
fense would have been sentenced under another statute.' The superior court
stated: "This court is of the opinion that the legislature reasonably could have
concluded that indeterminate sentences should be imposed on women as a
class, allowing the time of incarceration to be matched to the necessary treat-
ment in order to provide more effective rehabilitation."51 The dissenting judge
stated: "[U]nder the guise of special rehabilitation treatment for women, the
legislature, in the Muncy Statute, has adopted a system which accomplishes
little more than the imposition of harsher punishment for women offenders."52
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the dissenting judge.
Daniels was decided with Commonwealth v. Douglas,8 in which Daisy Doug-
on arrests. Despite the fact that women averaged 9% of the arrests, they constituted only
4% of the prison population, both state and federal. W. LUNDEN, CRIMES AND CRIMINALS
101, 265-67 (1967).
"' Reckless, Female Criminality, 3 NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N J. 1, 2 (1957).
4 In 1963 26.5% of all male felons in California were committed to prison while only
15.4% of the female felons were. Probated sentences were given to 68.5% of the females,
but only to 44% of the males. W. LUNDEN, supra note 43, at 265-67.
4 C. LOMBROSE & W. FERRERO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER 147 (1895), quoting Corrado
Celto.
4TSee note 43 supra.
"210 Pa. Super. 156, 232 A.2d 247 (1967).
"The applicable portion of the Muncy Act states: "Every sentence imposed pursuant to
this act shall be merely a general one to the State Industrial Home for Women, and shall
not fix or limit the duration thereof." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, S 566 (1964).
50 Act of June 19, 1911, ch. 1057, S 5, [1911] Pa. Laws 5.
11232 A.2d at 251-52. Immediately prior to this statement, the court cited Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and stated: "Of course, where funda-
mental rights and personal liberties may be affected a classification must be closely scrutinized
and carefully confined." 232 A.2d at 251.
" Id. at 255 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). Judge Hoffman felt Skinner v, Oklahoma was
analogous to the Daniels case. See notes 78-80 infra, and accompanying text for a discussion
of Skinner.
" 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
1972]
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las and a male co-defendant were both convicted of aggravated robbery and
conspiracy. The male defendant was sentenced to four to ten years, while Daisy
received an indeterminate sentence as ordered by the Muncy Act." The court
stated that an indeterminate sentence must be deemed to be the maximum term
decreed by law for the crime.5 A judge could exercise discretion in sentencing
a man by considering extenuating circumstances. However, under the Muncy
Act the judge had no such power when he sentenced a woman." The sentencing
judge, under the Muncy Act, had no power to impose a minimum or maximum
shorter than the maximum provided statutorily. Thus, as the court pointed out,
women were not given the right to have the judge ( 1 ) impose a shorter maxi-
mum than that provided by law, or (2) impose a minimum-maximum sen-
tence, both of which could be done where men are sentenced. This resulted in
an invidious discrimination, because discretion allowed the judge when sen-
tencing men was not available to the judge when sentencing women. There-
fore, if the discretion model is to be used, Daniels and Douglas teach that it
must be exercised with both sexes. The problem, however, is that it is not
applied equitably. Women uniformly fare much better than men when the
trial court has discretion. Give that discretion to the judge to be exercised with
both sexes in order to avoid discrimination, and the studies indicate that
women as a group will receive softer treatment, which is an end result al-
together different from the one sought.
III. STATUTORY SENTENCES AND THE UNIFORMITY MODEL
A. The Statutes
"Protecting" women has resulted in women, in many cases, being denied
equality of treatment.57 Such is the case with sentencing statutes enacted to
apply solely to women. Generally, sentencing statutes fall into several cate-
gories," based on the amount of discretion given the court in setting the mini-
mum and maximum sentence. The statutes dealing with sentences for women
are usually of the variety which set the limits and compel the judge to give an
indeterminate sentence within those limits."
5PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 566 (1964).
"See note 49 supra. The court cited Commonwealth v. Kalck, 239 Pa. 533, 541, 87
A. 61, 64 (1913), in which the court said: "A sentence for an indefinite term must be
deemed a sentence for the maximum term described by law as a punishment for the offense
committed."
" "Regardless of the facts and circumstances involved in each case, whether extenuating
or otherwise, a Judge in sentencing a woman has no discretion. . . .On the other hand,
a judge in sentencing a man ... may and does consider extenuating facts and factors. It
is clear, therefore, that an arbitrary and invidious discrimination exists ....... 243 A.2d
at 403.
51 "The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer in-
spection, been revealed as a cage." Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d
529, 541 (1971).
"Note, Statutory Structure for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1134
(1960), defines these categories and gives a detailed analysis of sentencing statutes. The
categories are defined as: (1) minimum and maximum term both set by the court; (2)
maximum and minimum term both set by the court, but minimum cannot exceed a certain
tercentage of the maximum; (3) maximum term fixed by statute and minimum term set
the court; (4) maximum term set by the court and minimum term fixed by statute;
(5) maximum and minimum term both fixed by statute.
"
8See notes 48-56 supra, and accompanying text. See also Note, 20 RUTGERS L. REv.
(Vol. 26
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A Kansas sentencing statute took from the trial judge the power of im-
posing a minimum sentence on women." An Indiana statute allowed male
persons accused of a felony to plead insanity, but was silent as to female
persons accused of the same crime." In Maine, the sentence for intoxication for
men was two years;"S for women, it was three years. 8 Fourteen states had or
have sentencing statutes applicable to women" calling for indeterminate sen-
tences, usually resulting in more severe sentences for women than men guilty
of the same offense."
B. Case Law
The Unsuccessful Equal Protection Challenges. In Daniels and Douglas the
court ordered that discretion be exercisable with both sexes. The appellants
there had argued that the lack of discretionary sentencing for women violated
the equal protection clause. But what about cases in which sentences for women
are provided by statute, leaving no discretion at all to the trial court? These
too have been subjected to the equal protection challenge.
Such a challenge to a sentencing statute was made in 1919. In State v.
Heitman," Mrs. L. 0. Heitman was convicted of keeping a liquor nuisance.
She was sentenced under a Kansas statute providing that every female shall
be sent to the women's industrial farm, and that the court "shall not fix the
limit or duration of the sentence."" The court acknowledged that if the de-
fendant had been a man she would have had a definite sentence. However,
the court reasoned that, since both sexes are subject to the same maximum
sentence, giving Mrs. Heitman an indefinite sentence did not violate the equal
protection clause."
756 n.3 (1966), in which the author defined the indeterminate sentence: "The term ...
is applicable to any sentence that results in incarceration in prison for an indefinite period
of time .... Such sentences permit parole boards to observe the adjustments of the inmate
in order to determine when release is appropriate."6
'Law of Aug. 1, 1917, ch. 298, § 5, [1917] Kan. Laws. The petitioner in Ex parte
Dunkerton, 104 Kan. 481, 179 P. 347 (1919), alleged that the law had the effect of taking
away the power of the trial judge to set a minimum sentence. See note 56 supra, and ac-
companying text.61 See Morgan v. State, 179 Ind. 300, 101 N.E. 6 (1913).
"
2 See Ex parte Gosselin, 144 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945).
68 id,
"See notes 7, 8 supra, and accompanying text. See also ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 575
(1960); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-804 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168a (West 1970).
" Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48
NEB. L. REv. 131, 151 (1968).
" 105 Kan. 139, 181 P. 630 (1919). The statute read: "Every female person ... who
shall be convicted of any offense against the criminal laws of this state . . . shall be sen-
tenced to the state industrial farm . . .but the court .. . shall not fix the limit or duration
of the sentence." 181 P. at 631.
7 Law of Aug. 1, 1917, ch. 298, § 5, [1917) Kan. Laws.
"See note 66 supra. The court, after setting out these unique qualities of womanhood,
concluded that the legislature was reasonable in treating women differently. Another Kansas
statute, Law of Aug. 1, 1917, ch. 215, § 1, [1917) Kan. Laws was challenged on the same
grounds in Ex parte Dunkerton, 104 Kan. 481, 179 P. 347 (1919). The petitioner claimed
the sentencing statute took away the court's discretion to impose a minimum sentence on
women. The court held that the legislature was not unreasonable in determining that women
should be more or less severely punished than men. For those who believe that imprison-
ment should have a deterrent effect on those contemplating crime, the Supreme Court of
Kansas offered some interesting insights into prison life. It stated: "Under the act women
are not subject to the debauching influence of the county jail and of the penitentiary and
of close confinement therein, but are placed in a field where labor is pleasant and restraint
is limited, and where the evil influence of other persons convicted of crime is minimized.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
A convicted prostitute challenged a California statute in Ex parte Carey."
She claimed the statute was more severe on the prostitute than on her male
partner." The court held the classification valid, stating: "The fact that the
fallen woman carries on the business of commercialized vice justifies whatever
discriminations may be found in the statute."'"
A statute in Massachusetts provided that any "female convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment shall be sentenced to the reformatory for women,"
and the court "shall not prescribe the limit of the sentence unless it is for
more than five years."7 Ruth Platt was found guilty of fornication and sen-
tenced to the reformatory "until discharged in due course of the law."" The
statute was upheld in the face of a challenge on the basis of equal protection."'
The court stated that the legislature was reasonable in classifying on the basis
of sex for the purpose of punishment."
As these and other illustrative cases show, equal protection challenges gen-
erally failed." When a court concluded the classification had a reasonable re-
lationship to a legitimate legislative end, such as rehabilitation of a criminal
offender, the statute was upheld. Even though sentencing statutes usually have
a legitimate legislative end, the real problem is whether women can be treated
differently due to the differences in rehabilitative capacity between the sexes.
If no difference exists, then presumably no classification based on it could be
reasonable. These cases fail to resolve the basic issue of whether women re-
habilitate faster than men.
7
The Equal Protection Door Begins To Open. Although the older cases indicate
that differences in sentencing based on sex are acceptable because women are
different from men, in more recent years the Supreme Court of the United
States, in cases dealing with other issues, has given several clues as to its atti-
tude on unequal sentencing. The Supreme Court in 1942 struck down an
Oklahoma statute which provided for sterilization of habitual criminals."
. . . The Legislature may very properly determine that women convicted of crime shall be
less severely punished than men convicted of the same crime." 179 P. at 348. The act, how-
ever, generally resulted in women being more, rather than less, severely punished.
6957 Cal. App. 297, 207 P. 271 (1922).
"°The court stated: "The relation sustained by the fallen woman to her business and
society at large is altogether unlike that sustained by her partner in crime. She follows a
business that can be carried on only by women. The most casual observer cannot fail to see
a vast difference between fallen women as a class and the balance of human kind." 207 P.
at 274.
71 Id.72See Platt v. Commonwealth, 256 Mass. 539, 152 N.E. 914, 915 (1926).
" 152 N.E. at 915.
7 4 
id.
7' Another court reached the same conclusion in Ex parte Gosselin, 144 Me. 412, 44
A.2d 882 (1945), in which the defendant was convicted of intoxication. The maximum sen-
tence for women was 3 years, while for men it was 2 years. The court stated that its duty
was to decide only if the legislature had acted reasonably in setting the different maximum
sentences. The court concluded that the statutory distinction was reasonable.
In Ex parte Brady, 116 Ohio St. 512, 157 N.E. 69 (1927), and State v. Beddow, 32
N.E.2d 34 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939), two statutes providing for indeterminate sentences for
women were also upheld. In both cases it was held that the maximum sentence was applica-
ble to men, as well as women, and the only difference was that the women were sent to a
different place of confinement.
70See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
77 See D. WARD & G. KASSEBAUM, supra note 2, at 56-79.
78 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
(Vol. 26
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"Habitual criminal" was defined as a person having been convicted two or
more times of crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude."" The
petitioner had been convicted once for stealing chickens and twice for robbery.
The Court struck down the statute on equal protection grounds. Although the
decision appears to be based on the holding that procreation is a fundamental
right, the Court was obviously not pleased with the different sentences the
statute permitted. "[WIhen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not
the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a par-
ticular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."'
A similar issue was presented in McLaughlin v. Florida.1 A Florida statute
prohibited an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living together in
the same room at night." No other statute penalized the same conduct when
engaged in by members of the same race. The Court held that the racial
classification violated the equal protection clause and invalidated the statute.
The Court, however, also stated: "It is readily apparent that § 798.05 treats
the interracial couple made up of a white person and a Negro diflerently than
it does any other couple .... as
The language of these cases indicates that unequal statutory sentencing is
susceptible to the equal protection challenge. While the two cases did not
strike statutes down solely because of unequal sentencing-but rather because
there was a fundamental right (procreation) and a suspect criterion (race)
involved-the sentencing aspect was mentioned in both cases. If Skinner and
McLaughlin represent a crack in the door of challenging disparity in sentencing
on equal protection grounds, in 1968 the door opened a few inches more.
Commonwealth v., Daniels" was followed by an important federal district
court case in the same year.
In United States ex rel. Robinson v. York" a Connecticut statute was chal-
lenged. The statute provided that women over sixteen who (1) plead guilty
or are convicted of felonies, or (2) plead guilty or are convicted of a mis-
demeanor, or (3) are unmarried, between sixteen and twenty-one, and are in
manifest danger of falling into habits of vice, or (4) are sentenced to jails,
may be committed to the state farm for women for an indefinite period up to
three years." Carrie Robinson claimed that this statute permitted women to
be incarcerated for periods in excess of the maximums provided for men found
guilty of the same crimes. The court cited Korematsu v. United States"' and
Loving v. Virginia," which involve protection of racial groups, and stated: "It
is difficult to find any reason why adult women.., should have a lesser measure
"Law of May 14, 1935, ch. 26, § 3, t1935] Okla. Laws 94.80316 U.S. at 541. See also the analysis in Rubin, supra note 45, at 74.
81 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
82FLA. STAT. ANN. S 798.05 (1965).
"379 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
"210 Pa. Super. 156, 232 A.2d 247 (1967); see notes 48-52 supra, and accompanying
text.tt281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968). The court stated that being on a work farm is still
imprisonment, and does not make longer sentences for women any less invidious. Id. at 14.
'
8 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 17-360 (1958).87323 U.S. 214 (1944).
88388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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of protection than a racial group.""9 The court also stated that there was no
showing that women take a longer time to rehabilitate than men." This fact
has never been shown in any case where indeterminate sentencing has been
upheld. Usually, it would appear that the legislature has made a determina-
tion that women have psychological characteristics which make longer periods
of imprisonment for rehabilitation necessary; the usual judicial response to
that determination has been that the legislature acted reasonably."' The hold-
ing in Robinson indicates a closer judicial scrutiny of statutes providing for
unequal sentencing."
Is Sex Suspect? The Supreme Court has yet to hold sex to be a suspect criteria,
which would place the burden on the state to show a compelling interest in
the classification in order to justify it.9' However, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia recently held a classification on the basis of sex to be suspect, thereby
making such classifications subject to close scrutiny. In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirbyp a California statute forbidding women to tend bar except under nar-
row circumstances was struck down because the state not only failed to estab-
lish a compelling interest served by the discrimination, but failed to establish
any interest at all." The court reasoned:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which the class
members are locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex from
8 281 F. Supp. at 14.
" The growing demand for different treatment for women at the turn of the century was
not prompted by any growing recognition of the differences, either psychological or other-
wise, between men and women. The main force behind the demand for separate legislation
was the changing view of women. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 518. "The state has failed to
carry its burden in support of the proposition that a greater period of imprisonment is
necessary for the deterrence of women than for men." 281 F. Supp. at 16. Thus two major
reasons for imprisonment, deterrence and rehabilitation, were not shown to present a valid
justification for discrimination on the basis of sex. The third major reason for imprisonment,
protection of society, is not likely to operate against the woman. Although women constitute
511% of the populace, they account for only 15 to 20% of the arrests, as the following table
shows, and only 4% of the prison population.
Male Female
Robbery 95.1% 4.9,%
Burglary 96.71% 3.3 %
Auto Theft 96.3 % 3.7%
Assault 86.0% 14.0%
Larceny 81.0% 19.0 %
Embezzlement 82.1% 17.9%
Murder 81.9% 18.1%
W. LUNDEN, supra note 43, at 102.
91 See notes 66-77 supra, and accompanying text.
12In United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York, 288 F. Supp. 955 (D. Conn. 1968), the
same statute was again called into question. The difference in the two cases was that the
petitioner in Robinson was over 21 and in Samrell she was not. Under a Connecticut statute
a minor male convicted of breach of the peace may be committed for a maximum of 2 years.
Under the statute in question, a minor female convicted of the same offense must be sen-
tenced to an indeterminate period of up to 3 years. The court held, therefore, that the im-
position of an indeterminate sentence violated the equal protection clause.93 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). The case involved CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODn § 25656 (West 1964). The special circumstances were expressed as: "The provisions
of this section do not apply to the dispensing ... by the wife of any license ...or ...
when she is the sole shareholder or when she and her husband are the sole shareholders
of the corporation which holds the on-sale license. 485 P.2d at 531 n.2, 95 Cal. Rptr.
at 331 n.2.
1'485 P.2d at 543.
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nonsuspect status ...and aligns it with the recognized suspect classifica-
tions is that the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society."
Assuming that the Supreme Court of the United States does not hold sex to
be suspect, as did the California court, the compelling interest analysis may
still be required. When a fundamental right is involved, the strict scrutiny
standard is also applied. Such rights as voting,"9  traveling interstate,"' or pro-
creation," have all been held to be fundamental by the Supreme Court. Im-
prisonment denies a great many fundamental rights. There is a denial of free-
dom of travel, association, and privacy. Since some sentencing statutes applic-
able only to women result in longer periods of imprisonment for women, there
is an interim period during which the male defendant is either under considera-
tion for parole, or, quite possibly, walking the streets. The female defendant,
on the other hand, is still in prison being "protected," which at the same time
involves a denial of all of these rights. It could be argued, therefore, that
despite the fact the Court has not held sex to be a suspect classification, the
stricter compelling interest test should be imposed on the states when called
upon to justify indeterminate sentencing for women."'
IV. THE GROUND BETWEEN THE Two MODELS
The preceding sections reveal marked discrepancies in sentencing, depending
on the sex of the offender."' Even though the prevailing American trend has
been to allow the judge wide discretion,' it can be said that "a statutory sys-
tem that leaves a wide, untrammeled discretion to judges is the doom of
equality of treatment."1" Yet, uniformity of sentencing cannot be said to be
the ideal either.!"4 No two criminal acts present the same threat to society, and
no two offenders have the same need for rehabilitation. Therefore, neither
model in its extreme form presents the most effective and equitable scheme
possible. Potential sources for a reform of these disparities are well within the
reach of the states. While varying views of the means of making such steps
"Id. at 540.
"See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).99 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
19 See Note, Longer Sentence for Females than for Males Convicted of Same Offense
Denies Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 921, 926 (1969):
ITihe apparent incapacity of the women's reformatory system to afford its
inmates a rehabilitative and curative experience-its failure to achieve the
penological purposes which might have justified a special sentencing struc-
ture--may underline the Daniel's court's willingness to strike down the sen-
tencing provisions of the Muncy Act as violative of equal protection. As faith
in the rehabilitative ideal further wanes, close judicial scrutiny may increas-
ingly be expected in areas hitherto deemed off limits to the "strict" standards
and tests of constitutional legality.
191 See notes 25-44 supra, and accompanying text.
192See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959). The same
court stated in Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 150, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959):
"The court below in determining the penalties considered the criminal act, but not the
criminal himself and in so doing committed an abuse of discretion."
103 See Rubin, supra note 43, at 73.
a" It is interesting to note, however, that apparently, as a group, women who commit
crimes are more likely to commit crimes of passion or nonviolent crimes. See note 90 supra.
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are certainly possible, the elimination of disparity should be a focal point of
consensus, as an obtainable and laudable goal for all concerned.
Appellate Review. The American Bar Association has suggested that one
method of controlling sentencing disparity is by appellate review of sen-
tences."0' The United States is one of the very few western nations which does
not provide for appellate review of sentences. 0' One possible consequence of
appellate review would be the establishment of more uniform sentencing cri-
teria."7 Unequal sentencing would be held to a minimum and used only in
cases where the trial court could justify the sentence.
However, before the trial court or the appellate court could make a valid
decision, there would appear to be a need for information on the offender's
personality. " For example, in People v. W/ade' °° a male and female attempted
a robbery. The female sat in a waiting car. Her male partner shot and killed
the proprietor of the store. A presentence psychiatric report on the female
showed that she became passive and submissive in times of stress."' This
would certainly appear to be a legitimate mitigating factor with respect to her
culpable intent. The results of such a presentence report should be available
to both the sentencing and reviewing courts.
Many commentators have called for the trial judge to be compelled to
justify his sentence for the record.1 1' It is unlikely that the trial judge would
admit that he gave a certain sentence because of his own background,11" or
that he was influenced by the sex, race, or educational level of the defendant,"'
despite the fact that these are the factors which have been found to influence
the severity of sentences. Nevertheless, as cases came before a court with facts
similar to previous cases, a pattern of sentencing would develop, and any
striking deviations from it would be obvious and would require justification.
Reform of Sentencing Statutes. In California, thirteen different maximums
are imposed for crimes defined as felonies.11 Pennsylvania and New York
1
'5ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1967).
100 George, supra note 22. See also Hearings on S. 2722 Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 86-100 (1966).
107 D'Esposito, supra note 19, at 183 n.8.
10 See Rubin, supra note 43, at 72.
°53 Cal. 2d 322, 348 P.2d 116, 1 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1959).110348 P.2d at 121.
... See, e.g., Thomas, Sentencing-The Case for Reasoned Decisions, 1963 CRIM. L.
REV. 243. Mr. Thomas cited four reasons for compelling a judge to justify his sentence:
(1) natural justice; (2) rationalization; (3) consistency in sentencing policy; and (4)
right to challenge the decision.
112 This is the factor found most relevant to sentencing in the Gaudet Study. See note
29 supra.
13These factors were found statistically significant in the Martin Study. See note 33
supra, and accompanying text.
114 See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 450:
There is nothing short of anarchy in the American statutes governing prison
sentences that the law [authorizes) on conviction of specific crimes ...
There can be no rational defense of such a plethora of legislative judgements,
the existence of which merely shows the failure of the legislature to perceive
the limits-psychological and logical--of reasonable determinations of this
kind. Too many distinctions of this order either must reduce the force of all
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each have twelve.11 The American Law Institute Model Penal Code and the
Model Sentencing Act both propose a redefinition of felonies into three cate-
gories.11" The Model Penal Code bases its classification on seriousness of the
crime. while the Model Sentencing Act focuses on the offender."1 Reform
by the use of either the Model Penal Code or the Model Sentencing Act would
amount to an expression of legislative intent on whether the sentencing judge
should focus primarily on the seriousness of the crime or the personal history
and disposition of the offender. Once that expression is made, sentencing criteria
would develop, on a case by case basis, defining the limits within which a sen-
tence should fall for a certain crime and on a certain personality. Without
question, personality is not usually a definable quantity; no two criminal acts
consist of the same circumstances which may mitigate or aggravate a sentence.
Nevertheless, gradually signposts would emerge from which a sentencing judge
could begin to consider other relevant factors.
Controlled Use of the Indeterminate Sentence. As previously discussed, dis-
crimination in favor of female offenders appears to exist whenever the judge
has discretion. When the judge has no discretion, the female offender appears
to be treated more severely than the male offender. The parole boards in the
women's reformatories have their hands tied until the minimum sentence has
been served. Under the Model Sentencing Act no minimum is imposed. The
time for consideration for parole comes when the parole board believes re-
habilitative efforts are proving successful. The American Bar Association
standards allow the judge to impose a short minimum."' The fact that this is
discretionary rather than obligatory has displeased some of the commenta-
tors.' 0 However, interests must be balanced. Society needs reassurance of its
safety and the offender needs rehabilitation. The statutorily imposed inde-
terminate sentence dealing with females has been shown to result in inequity.
In any case, the indeterminate sentence should be used with both male and
female offenders, or not at all.
V. CONCLUSION
There is considerable doubt that prisons rehabilitate. Some commentators
have charged that prisons are much more likely to frustrate, aggravate, and
and thus be nullified in practice or must produce results that are unjust and
an impediment to the administration of correction.
Id.
116 D'Esposito, supra note 19, at 187. The categories under the Model Penal Code are
first degree, second degree, and third degree; first degree has a minimum of 1 to 10 years
and a life maximum; second degree has a minimum of 1 to 3 years and a 10-year maxi-
mum; third degree has a 1 to 2 years minimum and a 5-year maximum. The Model Sen-
tencing Act has the categories of first degree, atrocious crimes, and ordinary felonies. None
of the categories has a minimum. The maximum for first degree felonies is life; for atro-
cious crimes it is 0 to 10 years; and for ordinary felonies it is 0 to 5 years.
11 See, e.g., Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 528 (1958).
118 See, e.g., Rubin, Allocation of Authority in the Sentencing-Correction Decision, 45
TEXAS L. REV. 455 (1967).
119 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
3.2(c) (Approved Draft 1968).
" See, e.g., George, supra note 21.
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alienate."' This Comment has assumed to a certain extent that prisons do
help; that the offender is released with a greater capability to cope with society
than when incarcerated.
The two models discussed have not provided a solution. A combination of
the two has been suggested here as a possible scheme. From these two models
a more equitable method of sentencing could be drawn. It is not fair that
women have an advantage when the judge has discretion; nor is it fair that,
under some statutory schemes, women can be imprisoned for longer periods
than men convicted of the same crime. The scheme suggested would still give
the trial judge discretion, but he would have to make his sentence with knowl-
edge that it was subject to appellate review. He would be encouraged to make
a decision based on factors more objective than his own life style or social
philosophy. If penal codes are reformed along the lines suggested in the Model
Penal Code and the Model Sentencing Act, the judge would be on notice of
whether the legislature wants him to focus on the crime or the offender when
he makes his sentencing decision. In either case, the judge's own views would
have less influence on the sentence than they presently appear to have.
.' See, e.g., Morris & Hawkins, Rehabilitation: Rhetoric and Reality, 34 FED. PROB.,
Dec. 1970, at 9. There it was stated: "Our program thus addresses an antique, overloaded,
neglected, expensive, cruel, and inefficient 'correctional' system." Id. For more detailed and
comprehensive works on the psychological effects of prison, see E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS
(1961); G. SYPES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958). Goffman refers to the reception
process as "role dispossession" because the inmate is stripped of almost all personal pos-
sessions.
The recruit comes in to the establishment with a conception of himself made
possible by certain stable social arrangements in his home world. Upon en-
trance, he is immediately stripped of the support provided by these arrange-
ments . .. he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and
profanations of self. His self is systematically, if often unintentionally,
mortified.
E. GOFFMAN, supra, at 14. For an excellent personal account of the initial entry into prison
for a woman, see D. WARD & G. KASSEBAUM, supra note 2, at 4-6. Among the feelings
discussed were disbelief, guilt, shock, loss of self-esteem, and suspicion. See also PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE ON PRISONER REHABILITATION, THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER-WHAT SHOULD
BE DONE? (1970); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Process, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962); Putney & Putney, Origins of the Reformatory, 53
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 427 (1962); Note, Longer Sentence for Females than Males Convicted
of the Same Offense Denies Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 921, 925 (1969).
It is interesting to note that one comprehensive study has indicated that women suffer
more psychological pain from imprisonment than men. The investigators pointed out that
while women have less extensive experience with "real crime" such as burglary, robbery,
and larceny, and less history of penal confinement, they nevertheless are subjected to greater
pains in confinement.
There are, then, a variety of ways in which male and female prison inmates
differ and these differences are rooted in social roles played in the free world
and in psychological needs unsatisfied in the prison world. The kind of ex-
periences women have had prior to prison have ill prepared them to cope with
pains of imprisonment which include indefinite loss of affection and inter-
personal support, role dispossession, and status degradation.
D. WARD & G. KASSEBAUM, supra note 2, at 74.
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